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INTRODUCTION
Corporate governance and business decisions are constantly made in
the name of shareholder value regardless of whether most shareholders
actually benefit.1 Over the past thirty years, the supposed need to
maximize shareholder value has helped to justify the financialization of
corporations, where corporate resources and priorities have shifted
towards the demands of financial markets, financial buyers, and financial
measures, and away from other constituents, such as employees and
communities. Shareholder value is a powerful idea; it is the cultural belief
that the singular and primary purpose of the firm is to create value (in the
form of a rising stock price) for the shareholders of a company, who are
conceptualized as “the owners,” with an inherent right to the assets of the
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firm, and whose control of corporations presumably benefits the larger
social economy.
Beginning in earnest during the 1980s and continuing into the present
moment, influential financial actors, led by Wall Street institutions,
corporate takeover artists, and investment firms, have worked to downsize
the corporation (cut costs and “delayer” as many stakeholders as possible)
and redistribute these so-called savings to financiers, institutional
shareholders, and financial advisors—at the cost of plummeting
reinvestment in research and development, infrastructure, workers,
communities, and market innovations, which require large, stable capital
investments over time. As a result, corporations that undergo constant
financial restructuring in the name of shareholder value are often at greater
risk of bankruptcy, employee instability, and organizational volatility, as
their long-term productivity is mined for short-term financial gain.
Through claims made in the name of shareholder value primacy and
immediacy, and the enactment of share price as the sole standard of
measurement for corporate success, the entirety of the corporation was
brought into the orbit of finance, reduced to a bundle of assets that could
be extracted for narrow financial interests and gains. This particular
cultural interpretation and deployment of shareholder value led firms to be
thought of, and practiced on, as sites of short-term value extraction.
Exemplified by restructured and financialized corporations, socioeconomic transformations have catalyzed a massive transfer of income to
the wealthy few—engineered largely by the financial industry. Over the
past forty years, dominant financial actors have successfully reframed the
very purpose of corporations, converting them from stable sources of
production and employment (at least for relatively privileged workers)
into sites for the extraction of financial wealth. The effects of these
practices and values have been staggering, as it is largely the siphoning of
financial wealth from corporations that has enabled the richest one percent
to capture nearly sixty percent of all income gains from 1993 to 2013.2
These massive changes have been justified by the invocations and
seductions of what I would call an origin myth—specifically, a set of
assumptions about the origins of major corporations, the concept of
proprietorship, the rights of ownership, and the roles of primary and
secondary markets. Dominant financial interests have capitalized on a set
2. See Emmanuel Saez, Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States
(Updated With 2013 Preliminary Estimates), at 4 (Jan. 25, 2015) (update to Emmanuel Saez, Striking
It Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States, PATHWAYS MAG., Winter 2008, at 6);
see also THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Arthur Goldhammer trans.,
2014).
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of historical fictions, often packaged and framed in terms of shareholder
value, to mobilize and legitimize a set of practices that mainly benefit
large-scale investors, such as private equity and leveraged buyout shops
that purchase entire corporations, as well as institutions who “advise” in
the name of shareholders. The result is that shareholder value—its
interpretations and representations, its uses and abuses, its appropriations
and mobilizations—has become a lightning rod for critics of
socioeconomic inequality and advocates of corporate social responsibility.
A growing chorus of voices, from critical legal scholars to climate justice
advocates, is critiquing the “shareholder value myth” for its contributions
to unsustainable corporate practices and financial crises—even as many
lodge full-throated defenses of this same myth.3
In this context, then, it is crucial to unpack and differentiate the
critiques of practices done in the name of shareholder value that mainly
benefit dominant finance from critiques of the shareholder value myth per
se. Oftentimes, in debates over shareholder value, the overwhelming
power of the financial sector to push its particular version of shareholder
value and to shape the terms of these debates goes unnoticed. At the same
time, it would be naïve to presume that the shareholder value myth—in
particular, the core ideology of shareholder value primacy, which rests on
concepts of shareholder ownership—is not somehow conducive to, and
mobilized in the service of, large financial interests.
The work of this Article, then, is to shed light on these debates, to
locate problematic appropriations of shareholder value ideologies, and to
disentangle abuses of power from more capacious, though still limited,
interpretations of shareholder value. To do so, it is necessary to go beyond
the shorthand and hackneyed invocations of “shareholder value” to gain a
deeper understanding of the ideological building blocks and the
underlying cultural and historical assumptions, which imbue declarations
of shareholder value with such primacy and generative force. In this
endeavor, this Article will engage the taken-for-granted assumptions that
somehow corporations “belong” to shareholders because shareholders, in
turn, “birthed” them, and, in the same vein, that investors and financial
markets in general are the originators of foundational and productive
capital that has allowed corporations to thrive and created jobs. It will
challenge origin myths and historical misrecognitions of financial
markets, shareholding, and proprietorship that have allowed dominant
finance to justify its own practices in the name of shareholder value when,
in fact, the overall stability and productivity of the underlying corporations
3. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Sublime Myths: An Essay in Honor of the Shareholder Value
Myth and the Tooth Fairy, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 911 (2013); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments
for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1190 (2002).
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have been damaged (or liquidated) over the past forty years, and
“everyday” shareholders hardly benefit as much as is touted.
Part I of this Article analyzes some of the contemporary critiques of,
and debates around, shareholder value in order to illustrate why many of
these contestations demonstrate underlying gaps or problematic assertions
in the history and politics of shareholder value, especially if they are
delimited by the narrow legal frames and neoliberal assumptions of
corporations. It also provides the context necessary to explicate and
ground why shareholder primacy and ownership assumptions are
historically and legally flawed, and how financial values and assumptions
continue to be championed (and financial power elided), despite the recent
implosions of shareholder value. Part II expands upon several leading
scholars’ work in showing the paradoxical and ahistorical nature of the
shareholder ownership assumption and the conflation of primary and
secondary financial markets. Throughout, this Article attempts to
differentiate and disentangle multiple problems with the shareholder value
interpretation by emphasizing Wall Street’s undue influence, the myth and
ideology of shareholder value primacy, and the intersections between
them.
I. BACKGROUND: SHAREHOLDER VALUE CONTESTATIONS
It would not be an exaggeration to state that shareholder value has
been business and legal orthodoxy since the 1980s. It was not until the
global financial crisis of 2008, instigated in large part by Wall Street
financial institutions, that doubts about the self-evidence of shareholder
value began to bubble into the mainstream—beyond the circles of
economic justice advocates, social critics, and critical legal, cultural, and
social scientific scholars. For example, in the wake of the 2008 financial
crisis, Harvard Business School scholars Rakesh Khurana and Nitin
Nohria argued the following:
To regain society’s trust, we believe that business leaders must
embrace a way of looking at their role that goes beyond their
responsibility to the shareholder to include a civic and personal
commitment to their duty as institutional custodians. In other words,
it is time that management became a profession.4

Even the former CEO of General Electric, Jack Welch, one of the
strictest adherents to shareholder value primacy, who deployed that logic
to radically restructure his firm through massive layoffs and redistribution
of “savings” to shareholders, declared, “[o]n the face of it, shareholder
4. Rakesh Khurana & Nitin Nohria, It’s Time to Make Management a True Profession, HARV.
BUS. REV., Oct. 2008, at 70.
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value is the dumbest idea in the world. . . . Shareholder value is a result,
not a strategy . . . Your main constituencies are your employees, your
customers and your products.”5
The recent surprise announcement by the Business Roundtable on
the “Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation” has generated speculation
that the era of shareholder value primacy is waning. Composed of almost
200 leading CEOs of major U.S. corporations, the Business Roundtable—
pivoting away from its own proclaimed shareholder value orthodoxy,
which had unequivocally stated since 1997 that the singular purpose of all
corporations is simply to generate shareholder value—pledged that its new
purpose was to help create an economy that could “serve[] all
Americans.”6 While being mindful of the nationalist undertones borne of
the present moment, the “reframing” of the purpose of corporations
towards “the benefit of all stakeholders—customers, employees, suppliers,
communities, and shareholders”7 is an important move away from a
short-sighted and short-term insistence on shareholder primacy.
At the same time, it is important to approach this apparent merging
of stakeholder and shareholder interests with some caution. Historically,
when stakeholder and shareholder interests have been translated into one
another, or conflated, this move has led to the eventual undermining of
other stakeholders’ interests in favor of declarations of shareholder value.
It would thus be advisable to be circumspect as to the limits of such a
declaration, as well as to the problems that can ensue when multiple
interests are laid side by side, as if they were nonhierarchical.8 In other
words, we have been through precisely this kind of reframing before, and
a particular version of shareholder value won.
When the Business Roundtable was first constituted in 1972, during
the peak era of managerial capitalism—when corporations were
understood to be long-term social institutions, albeit hierarchical,
exclusive, and paternalistic—it declared “social responsibility” to be one
of several core functions of a corporation. And yet, soon afterwards and
into the 1980s, the Business Roundtable began to justify long-term
investments, a commitment to stakeholders, and social responsibility itself
in terms of shareholder value. This deference was due, in part, to the
5. Francesco Guerrera, Welch Condemns Share Price Focus, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2009),
https://www.ft.com/content/294ff1f2-0f27-11de-ba10-0000779fd2ac (last visited Jan. 23, 2020).
6. Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy That
Serves All Americans’, BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019) [hereinafter Business Roundtable
Redefines the Purpose], https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-thepurpose-of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans [https://perma.cc/R865HM4A].
7. Id.
8. See id.
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growing dominance of a financialized worldview of the corporation,
where both Wall Street and neoliberal economists began to converge on
demands that short-term stock price appreciation serves as the key means
through which the agents of corporations (understood to be managers)
served the interests of the owners of corporations (understood to be the
shareholders). Consequently, to justify a more stakeholder-oriented,
social-entity view of the corporation to the growing chorus of shareholder
value advocates, proponents of managerial or stakeholder capitalism
balanced the tension between the immediate insistence to “unlock
shareholder value now” with long-term investments in everything from
research and development to employee benefits by arguing that all such
investments would, in time, generate shareholder value. Of course, such a
reductive framing of the multiplicity of the corporation (its responsibility
to society at large) was, in hindsight, a slippery slope. This framing was
intended to anticipate and fit within the relatively narrow frame and
agenda of shareholder value. As I have argued elsewhere, “[t]he danger of
this kind of discursive translation is the insertion of shareholder value as
baseline measurement for all corporate practice. With some temporal
flexibility, stock price was seen as having the ability to stand for and to
symbolize all the positive results of corporate choices.”9 One could argue
that by adopting the language of shareholder value, social entity
proponents helped pave the way for the soon-to-be dominant view of
corporations as primarily financial entities.
The Business Roundtable’s balancing act between shareholders and
stakeholders in the 1980s and 1990s is directly mirrored in its 2019
position. What is crucial to remember is that when shareholder value is
framed as the most important measure and shareholders are viewed as key
constituents, attempts to negotiate these tensions have historically
collapsed the interests of stakeholders into those of shareholders—and
shareholders continue to be problematically understood as the owners of
corporations. Until this ideological assumption of ownership is
challenged, shareholder value advocates will continue to claim for
shareholders a foundational right to the corporation and advance the
(illogical) argument that a focus on stock price should theoretically benefit
all constituents.10 It is thus important to recognize the limits of the
Business Roundtable’s recent declaration, as throughout the 1980s and
into the 1990s they acknowledged the existence of multiple
9. KAREN HO, LIQUIDATED: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF WALL STREET 211 (2009).
10. Having said this, it is important to be open to the fact that the 2019 Business Roundtable
reframing of corporate purpose could herald a new “common sense,” especially given that the
theoretical, academic, and on-the-ground virtues of shareholder value have been increasingly
challenged since the Great Recession. See Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose, supra note 6.
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stakeholders—while still subordinating multiple agendas to the pursuit of
shareholder value.
Of course, the discursive contestations and translations around
shareholder value also evince an architecture of policies, values, decisions,
and institutions that has been structured on shareholder value. Shareholder
value, after all, is both a myth and a social fact.11 Here, it would be useful
to analyze recent legal debates between a defender of shareholder value,
Yale Law School professor Jonathan Macey, and one of its most
influential and strident critics, Lynn Stout, a former professor at Cornell
Law School. This debate is directly instructive of both the common pitfalls
in mainstream and academic debates about shareholder value, and the
extent to which the ongoing reproduction of particular interpretations of
shareholder value depends upon an entire assemblage of underlying ideas,
assumptions, and practices that must be challenged.
In Sublime Myths: An Essay in Honor of the Shareholder Value Myth
and the Tooth Fairy,12 a tongue-in-cheek and rather reproachful review of
Lynn Stout’s book The Shareholder Value Myth: How Putting
Shareholders First Harms Investors, Corporations, and the Public, Macey
deploys dominant and problematic assumptions to criticize Stout for
staging a feigned controversy.13 Specifically, he is confused as to why she
would frame shareholder value primacy as a problem, since, as he puts it,
shareholder value is “but a sheep in wolf’s clothing.”14 As Macey
rationalizes, since managers hardly do enough to maximize shareholder
value—there is no direct legal requirement to do so, nor are they forced to
take any “extreme or socially destructive actions” to achieve it—it can
hardly be dubbed a problem or even a primacy, only a laudable
“aspiration.”15 Falling prey to the narrow fiction of managers as self11. Anthropologists have long analyzed and approached “myth” not so much as “alternative
facts” or “fake news,” but as powerful narratives and ideologies that shape community identities,
meaning, and social organization. See generally BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, MAGIC, SCIENCE AND
RELIGION AND OTHER ESSAYS (Robert Redfield ed., 1948); Sylvia J. Yanagisako & Carol L. Delaney,
Naturalizing Power, in NATURALIZING POWER: ESSAYS IN FEMINIST CULTURAL ANALYSIS 1, 1
(Sylvia Yanagisako & Carol Delaney eds., 1995). In a related vein, we do not examine and understand
“facts” in a vacuum: engaging with the term “social facts,” we analyze how and in what ways
collectively generated beliefs, societal structures, and uneven power relations shape individual and
social understandings of truth, facts, and objectivity, and what counts as such. See generally Emile
Durkheim, What Is a Social Fact?, in THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD 1, 50 (Steven Lukes ed.,
1965); Karen Ho & Jillian R. Cavanaugh, What Happened to Social Facts?, 121 AM.
ANTHROPOLOGIST 160 (2019).
12. See generally Macey, supra note 3. This title betrays his presumption that the shareholder
value myth is as “beneficent” as that of the tooth fairy.
13. Here, I mainly focus on Lynn Stout’s scholarship with respect to Jonathan Macey’s critique.
In the next Part, I engage with her important work more directly.
14. Macey, supra note 3, at 912.
15. Id. at 912, 920.
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serving agents of shareholders (who are presumed to be the true principals
of the corporation), Macey argues that despite managerial lip service to
shareholder value, often belied by their practices, the “shareholder wealth
maximization model” at least serves as a countervailing check to prevent
managers from “steal[ing] from the company with impunity.”16 Besides,
he continues, since Stout claims that “shareholder primacy is a myth,” then
“she must be wrong in her claim that it is a serious threat or problem.
Myths do not pose real threats,” as they are only “imaginary.”17
Meanwhile, Lynn Stout calls shareholder value, specifically
shareholder value primacy and its theoretical underpinnings, “myths” for
strategic reasons.18 She recognizes that part of what continues to animate
this theory and set of priorities is the assumption that shareholder value
primacy is akin to “truth,” problematically assumed to be enshrined in
corporate law and charter (which she debunks). Dubbing it “myth” serves
to challenge its dominance and deconstruct its power. Moreover, any
cultural anthropologist would certainly challenge Macey on his misplaced
understanding of myth: its constructedness, its historical contingency, and
its origins in narrative do not diminish its social power and influence. One
need only look to the example of race: the fact that it is a social
construction does not make it any less real. In fact, race is probably the
quintessential example of a myth—an imaginary concept shaped by
historical and material interests—that has had world-changing and
ongoing structural effects, illustrating the mutual constitution of discourse
and practice. To claim that myth can pose no real threat is therefore
contrary to social fact and anthropological understanding.
And yet, Macey’s confusion regarding the conundrum—how can
shareholder value primacy be harmful to shareholders themselves (not to
mention corporations)19—is understandable. Why blame shareholder
16. Id. at 920.
17. Id. at 913, 923.
18. LYNN A. STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST
HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 14 (2012).
19. There is longstanding and substantive evidence that short-term shareholder value primacy
has damaged and dismantled corporations as social institutions and has often undermined long-term
stock price stability and appreciation. As business and management scholar Gerald Davis has
demonstrated, “after two decades of ‘shareholder value,’” public corporations have faced heightened
turnover and faced demise: “only three” corporations “are left” on the Dow Jones industrial index
from the original thirty. Gerald F. Davis, After the Ownership Society: Another World Is Possible, in
MARKETS ON TRIAL: THE ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY OF THE U.S. FINANCIAL CRISIS, 331, 333 (Paul M.
Hirsch & Michael Lounsbury eds., 2010). “The number of public corporations in the United States in
2009 was half what it had been in 1997,” Gerald F. Davis, The Twilight of the Berle and Means
Corporation, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1121, 1134 (2011), and “thanks to two decades of restructuring
driven by a quest for shareholder value . . . . the career ladder had been replaced by the career Roach
Motel as another unexpected consequence of the shareholder value movement,” Gerald F. Davis, The
Rise and Fall of Finance and the End of the Society of Organizations, 23 ACAD. MGMT. PERSP. 27,

2020]

In the Name of Shareholder Value

617

value for the ineffectiveness of multiple actors, especially corporate
executives?20 He takes particular issue with Stout’s example of the
massive BP oil spill, where she hints that “shareholder value thinking”
influenced the company’s cost-cutting and disregard for safety standards,
which in turn catalyzed the resulting explosion, ecological devastation,
and decimation of the gulf (not to mention BP’s stock price).21 Yet, Macey
is dissatisfied with Stout’s explanation:
[E]ven if one were to fantasize that some misguided notion of
shareholder value maximization on the part of BP management
somehow was to blame for the Deepwater Horizon disaster in the
Gulf of Mexico, it does not stand to reason that shareholder value
maximization in general is at fault. In fact, the opposite is true. If BP
was trying to maximize value for shareholders, it failed miserably. It
failed to such an extent that shareholders in BP . . . can sue BP for its
failure to adequately protect shareholders’ wealth . . . .22

The issue here is a gap in analysis and, I would argue, insufficient
attention to financial interests, actors, and institutions, which are key
players in these developments.
While Macey is correct to point out that shareholder value per se is
not always the culprit, and while Stout is even more on target when she
points out more specifically that “shareholder value primacy and thinking”
are at fault, neither focus their attention on the elephant in the room: Wall
Street financiers, investors, and advisors, whose role as spokespeople of
the financial markets and guardians of stock price primacy often serves to
prevent scrutiny. Their continual encouragement of and engagement in
expedient financial practices (such as increasing corporate debt loads)
often undermine the long-term sustainability and stability of the firms they
advise, not to mention shareholder value. In other words, the
contradictions of shareholder value are thrown into sharp relief for a
35 (2009). Lynn Stout makes a similar argument. She writes, “Corporate America’s mass embrace of
shareholder value thinking has not translated into better corporate or economic performance. The past
dozen years have seen a daisy chain of corporate disasters, from massive frauds . . . to the near-failure
and subsequent costly taxpayer bailout of many of our largest financial institutions . . . .” STOUT, supra
note 18, at 11.
20. Corporate executives do not always do a competent job of creating shareholder value over
time (meaning shareholder value is proclaimed but not always enacted). While shareholder value has
the potential to be capacious and could be practiced and interpreted in ways that benefit multiple
parties, the issue is that managers are incentivized to be short-term, and oftentimes mortgage the longterm stability and productivity of the organization. Of course, the fact that many high-level corporate
executives are compensated through stock options and thus are themselves “shareholders” should give
defenders of shareholder value pause and encourage them to ruminate about the potentially short-term,
institutionally-extractive effects of shareholder value approaches.
21. STOUT, supra note 18, at 1–2.
22. Macey, supra note 3, at 922.
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number of reasons. The financial market actors charged with promoting
and protecting shareholder value often undermine or destabilize
companies, preventing them from generating sustained shareholder value
in the long term. Corporate executives and managers, through stock option
compensation plans, are themselves aligned with financial markets rather
than the long-term sustenance of the institution. The very discourse and
assumptions undergirding shareholder value are themselves based on
problematic assumptions and origin myths of ownership that narrow the
purview of corporations and misrecognize their history. Understanding the
multiple reasons why shareholder value is so contested—why critics often
find it difficult to pinpoint the reasons for their discontent and why
proponents of it often experience unsatisfactory trajectories, outcomes, or
deferrals—is therefore crucial in order to disentangle the multiple
practices mobilized in the name of shareholder value. I now turn to the
problematic conceptions embedded in assumptions of shareholder value.
Returning to Macey, we see evidence of these assumptions. Despite
his concurrence with Stout that shareholder value is an ideology,23 he holds
steadfast to the notion, which he presumes to be an underlying truth, that
somehow shareholders’ privileged claims to and status within the
corporation are legitimated by the assumption that they contributed
original capital to corporations at their founding.24 In fact, Macey defends
shareholder value because he argues that “shareholder money” is “required
to capitalize the corporation,” and that, therefore, corporate executives and
directors should not have broad leeway, according to the business
judgment rule, to manage the corporation according to multiple shifting
demands, as they would otherwise be “free to do virtually anything they
want with and to shareholders’ money and never have to say they are sorry
to shareholders, courts, workers, or anybody else.”25 While “anybody else”
is thrown in to conjure safety in numbers, Macey’s core presumption is
that the corporation is really just an instantiation of “shareholders’
money.”26 This origin myth has generated its own effects and logics that,
I would argue, have warped the narrative order of things: the myth of
shareholder ownership has in turn engendered a logic of entrepreneurship
based on an ahistorical misreading of shareholder risk taking.
For example, Macey argues that downplaying shareholder value
primacy would eliminate the all-important corporate activity of “risk
taking”:

23. See id at 917.
24. See id. at 912.
25. Id. at 921.
26. See id. at 917.
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If we diminish, much less eliminate, shareholders from our list of
constituencies that corporate managers are supposed to serve, we are
left only with the interests of fixed claimants, i.e., those claimants
like workers, creditors, and local communities who enter into specific
contractual relationships with corporations. For solvent companies,
meeting the obligations owed to these constituencies does not require
marginal risk taking. Marginal risk taking benefits only shareholders.
Thus, Professor Stout’s eliminating the myth of shareholder value
also would eliminate the reality of risk taking, which is the critical
component of entrepreneurship.27

As I will unpack further in the next Part, equating current shareholder
equity with the risk-taking, entrepreneurial “founder-capital” that
germinated the corporation is a historical misreading that confuses
primary markets with secondary financial markets. Historically, most
shareholders only engage with corporations through shares introduced and
traded in the secondary markets after corporations have already been
founded and are already operational through their own retained earnings.
In fact, the anthropologist Alexandra Ouroussoff has demonstrated that the
intense pressure corporate managers face from financiers and financial
advisors to extracted short-term shareholder value has actually prevented
corporations from taking risks, as shareholder primacy privileges
immediate returns, not the long-term risks necessary for innovation.28 The
dense assemblage of seemingly self-evident logics scaffolded onto
shareholder value necessarily blinds scholars to its mythical qualities, to
recognizing that shareholder value is a myth imbued with great social
power.
II. CHALLENGING THE ASSUMPTION OF
SHAREHOLDER OWNERSHIP
The basic assumption of shareholder ownership, that shareholders
are foundational to the corporation, must be actively challenged by
scholarship from multiple disciplines, in a variety of business and industry
circles, and in the area of public education and understanding. For
example, June Carbone and Nancy Levit, in a recent 2017 Minnesota Law
Review article entitled The Death of the Firm, insightfully observe that
“the firm as entity is disappearing as a unit of legal analysis” and argue
that it is “an ideological shift in the treatment of the firm” that has
collapsed and reduced the firm into a social organization “greater than the
sum of its parts,” beholden to multiple stakeholders, into “the narrowly
27. Id. at 920.
28. See ALEXANDRA OUROUSSOFF, WALL STREET AT WAR: THE SECRET STRUGGLE FOR THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY (2010).
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defined interests of a company’s immediate owners,” who turn to the
financial markets to measure the value of their holdings.29 The entity is
continually liquidated, so to speak, in order to maximize in the name of
the shareholder. While Carbone and Levit importantly and astutely
question the societal impact of this ideological turn in the purpose and
governance of a corporation, they too hold intact the core notion of
ownership, specifically that shareholders do, in fact, “own” the
corporation.
In this vein, it might be instructive to further engage and extend the
work of the legal scholar Lynn Stout, who had been at the forefront of the
critique against these interrelated, co-dependent logics. In a 2002 Southern
California Law Review article, Stout maintained that the “worst” yet “most
common” defense of shareholder primacy is the “bad argument” that “the
public corporation ‘belongs’ to its shareholders.”30 The logic is as follows:
because shareholders own the corporation, they are entitled to all the
firm’s earnings and assets, and moreover, the managers must work to
maximize the owners’ wealth through stock price appreciation. It is,
therefore, important to question and dismantle the building blocks of this
logic.
Stout points out that the primacy of shareholder value depends on a
problematic conflation: shareholders own shares or stock, a corporate
security, not the corporation itself.31 Given this social fact, we must then
ask ourselves what the ownership of a stock means, and what the rights
conferred upon this kind of ownership are. Again, Stout argues that these
ownership rights are “quite limited,” as public company shareholders
neither have the “right to exercise control over the corporation’s assets”
nor the “right to help themselves to the firm’s earnings”; these are decided
by the board of directors.32 As Stout further clarified in 2013:
Although laymen sometimes have difficulty understanding the point,
corporations are legal entities that own themselves, just as human
entities own themselves. What shareholders own are shares, a type of
contract between the shareholder and the legal entity that gives
shareholders limited legal rights. In this regard, shareholders stand on
equal footing with the corporation’s bondholders, suppliers, and

29. June Carbone & Nancy Levit, The Death of the Firm, 101 MINN. L. REV. 963, 963–64 (2017)
(emphasis added).
30. See Stout, supra note 3, at 1190.
31. See STOUT, supra note 18, at 13; Stout, supra note 3, at 1191.
32. Stout, supra note 3, at 1191.
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employees, all of whom also enter contracts with the firm that give
them limited legal rights.33

Empirically then, “equity holders” have a similar status to
bondholders, and yet the presumption of ownership, not to mention their
privileged positionality as central claimants and direct principals of the
corporation, holds steadfast. As Stout astutely observes, “The notion that
corporate law requires directors, executives, and employees to maximize
shareholder wealth simply is not true. There is no solid legal support for
the claim that directors and executives in U.S. public corporations have an
enforceable legal duty to maximize shareholder wealth. The idea is
fable.”34
As such, it is important to unpack why such a problematic claim has
had such enduring power, as well as how the deployment of shareholder
value primacy since the 1980s—while entirely new and unprecedented in
its reach and its generation of socio-economic inequality—depended on
the coming together of multiple and longstanding discursive strands from
finance, the state, academia, neoliberal and conservative ideologies, and
so on. Here, I track these convergences.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a particular strand of neoliberal
and financial economic ideology developed in academia to address
contestations around corporate governance tilted the narrative of corporate
purpose in Wall Street’s favor by advocating for the righteousness of the
“shareholder-as-owner” myth. Perhaps the most influential academic
catalyst was Milton Friedman’s ubiquitously cited, infamous argument in
The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, where he
presents the following ideas and beliefs as facts: that shareholders own
corporations; that corporations are created solely by shareholders’ money;
that shareholders are the ultimate employers; and, therefore, that not acting
primarily in the interest of shareholders betrays the very tenets of a free
society and is tantamount to “preaching pure and unadulterated
socialism.”35
In addition, financial economists and business school professors
promoted a view of the corporation called “agency theory”: seductive in
its simplicity, it was a theoretical model based on an origin myth
concerning shareholders’ historically fictive role in the founding of
modern corporations, and promoted the notion that managers should be
33. Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth, in BUSINESS IN ETHICAL FOCUS: AN
ANTHOLOGY 79, 80 (Fritz Allhoff et al. eds., 2d ed. 2016).
34. STOUT, supra note 18, at 25.
35. Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine—The Social Responsibility of Business is to
Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, at 32; see STOUT, supra note 18, at 18–19; Stout,
supra note 3, at 1190–92; Stout, supra note 33, at 2.
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the “agents” of the true principals of a corporation, which were presumed
to be the shareholders. The seductive appeal of this seemingly tight and
coherent argument—which fulfilled capitalist, individualist, and
democratic impulses because the owners of capital received the spoils of
industry, and yet technically anyone could buy stock and be an owner—
cannot be underestimated. Importantly, Lynn Stout critiques this ensuing
generation of neoclassical and neoliberal economic adherents who
repeated Friedman’s theoretical assertions so constantly and uncritically
that these ideological arguments took on the status of fact.36
It would not be too far-fetched to state that the Friedman article,
which begat the perennially-cited 1976 Michael Jensen and William
Meckling article Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs,
and Ownership Structure, established a genealogy of the financialized
firm that, through the iterative process, made shareholder value seem
natural and self-evident.37 Both articles, and countless others, promoted
the “erroneous belief that shareholders ‘own’ corporations” and the
corollary idea that shareholders are the corporation’s residual claimants,
thereby building up from these problematic assumptions an ideological
foundation for imperatives of shareholder maximization and narratives of
managerial betrayal.38 As legal scholars such as Lynn Stout and
sociologists such as Frank Dobbin and Dirk Zorn have noticed, the key
proponents of these seductive ideas had little to no background in
corporate law or in the daily workings and navigations of industry and
business. As such, they “failed to capture the real economic structure of
public companies with directors, executives, shareholders, debtholders,
and other stakeholders”39; these theories were ironically “widely
influential, considering that [they were] cooked up by a couple of business
school professors at the University of Rochester and not by a titan of
industry.”40
Given the enduring hold of the myth of shareholder ownership, it
comes as no surprise that it works in concert with and influences two other
legally erroneous arguments that are used to uphold the notion of
shareholder primacy. For example, Stout argues that the shareholders as
“residual claimants” argument is a faulty rationale used to construct a
36. See STOUT, supra note 18, at 18; Stout, supra note 33, at 2.
37. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
38. Stout, supra note 33, at 3; see also STOUT, supra note 18, at 36–41; Stout, supra note 3, at
1192.
39. STOUT, supra note 18, at 28.
40. Frank Dobbin & Jiwook Jung, The Misapplication of Mr. Michael Jensen: How Agency
Theory Brought Down the Economy and Why It Might Again, in MARKETS ON TRIAL: THE ECONOMIC
SOCIOLOGY OF THE U.S. FINANCIAL CRISIS 29, 32 (Paul M. Hirsch & Michael Lounsbury eds., 2010).
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privileged position for shareholders. She explains that, in fact,
“[s]hareholders are residual claimants only when failed companies are
being liquidated in bankruptcy,” and that, thus, this framing should not be
used to determine corporate purpose in the regular course of business.41
Specifically, “[t]he law applies different rules to healthy companies, where
the legal entity is its own residual claimant, meaning that the entity is
entitled to keep its profits and to use them as its board of directors sees
fit.”42 Similarly, a corollary legal error that similarly supports the mistaken
claim that corporations must be governed strictly for the benefit of
shareholders is the belief that corporate executives serve as agents for the
shareholder, who is understood to be the principal, when, in fact, there is
no right of the latter to control the former.43 This understanding is based
upon a historical misconception that shareholders founded corporations,
and thus that all ensuing stakeholders must serve shareholder needs.
Specifically, Stout argues that “[s]hareholders lack the legal authority to
control directors or executives”44 and “[t]he business judgement rule
ensures that, contrary to popular belief, the managers of public companies
have no enforceable legal duty to maximize shareholder values.”45
Shareholder primacy is thus, a societal, academic, and managerial
choice promoted by financiers and other powerful actors, but “not a legal
requirement.”46 There must, therefore, be other factors and explanations,
beyond the law, to explain how the ideologies and interests of Wall Street,
shareholder value advocates, and neoliberal economists became common
sense in American business. Additional historical and societal
intersections and contexts are at play. It is no accident that agency theory
and particular framings of capitalist ownership have acquired such
authority in American society, despite their failure to address inequalities.
To further understand how shareholder value arguments gained
traction as part of larger historical and socio-economic processes,
mobilizations, interests, and events, it is crucial to engage with historian
Julia Ott’s work on the history of capitalism in the United States. In When
Wall Street Met Main Street: The Quest for an Investor’s Democracy, Ott
argues that financial and “equity” ownership through the selling of bonds
and stocks has long captured the American imagination and fueled and
legitimated conservative and nationalist notions of property ownership and
wealth accumulation. She painstakingly shows how, in the early twentieth
41. Stout, supra note 33, at 3.
42. Id. (emphasis added).
43. See STOUT, supra note 18, at 42.
44. Stout, supra note 33, at 3.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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century, many of the largest corporations, such as AT&T, capitalized on
Americans’ newfound patriotic interest in securities (fueled by the sale of
Liberty Bonds during WWI) to promote the sale of corporate stock.47
Using the rationale of “shareholder democracy”—that the nation consisted
of a community of property owners—these companies sought to roll back
the regulatory state and to curtail protections for employees by postulating
to the public that, since employees and others could become shareholders
and shareholders were “owners,” corporations did not need to extend
protections to these potential “proprietors” (of stock), who were in reality
mostly “propertyless wage-laborers.”48
Of course, during this time, owners of a few shares with meager
protections did not have access to wealth accumulation as did individual
property owners of land or business, and yet, in order to market and
promote the purchase of securities among the masses, the financial
securities industry leveraged their deep-seated aspirations to construct a
false similarity between the ownership of shares and the ownership of the
means of production. As the flourishing pre-1929 stock market masked
growing inequality, Ott shows how shareholder value maximization came
to be utilized by large corporations, with significant support and buy-in
from the state, to tell stories of mass investment, harmonize class interests,
and deflect corporations from regulatory oversight. Even in the wake of
the Great Depression, which dealt shareholder capitalism a severe blow,
New Deal policies and compromises not only rescued American
capitalism but also rehabilitated the notion of mass investment in the
financial markets as a way for key players to continue promoting securities
ownership, capital investments, and dominant notions of property and
proprietorship.49
This historical context of shareholder value justifications in the name
of investor democracy is germane because it illustrates the multiple ways
in which assumptions about ownership, proprietorship, and property have
been mobilized in situations that were often quite different from each
other, and where one tenuous claim was often used to give strength to
another tenuous claim. Specifically, the equating of corporate stock
ownership with independent proprietorship in order to solidify cultural and
economic legitimacy for capitalism in the early-to-mid-twentieth century
reveals two origin myths. First, there was a paucity of individual
proprietorships, as the stark and growing inequalities in the U.S. between
Wall Street financiers and corporate leaders on the one hand and the
47. See generally JULIA C. OTT, WHEN WALL STREET MET MAIN STREET: THE QUEST FOR AN
INVESTORS’ DEMOCRACY (2011).
48. Id. at 3–6, 25.
49. See id. at 214–216.
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majority of employees and the left-out masses on the other50 were more
characteristic of the time. Second, stock ownership allowed neither
proprietorship nor control of the company itself, as shareholding of public
corporations was created—in the first instance—to enable owners of stock
to “play” in the stock market. This historical context is crucial to
unpacking shareholder value origin myths.
The stock market in the U.S. was deliberately created to separate
stockholding from the day-to-day business of the corporation, and to
separate stockholders from control of the firm and access to its retained
earnings. Stockholders engaged in the separated space of the stock market,
not the corporation itself, and therefore, “the very notion of returning to a
time when shareholders owned and controlled their enterprises is itself a
fantasy.”51 In fact, shareholders historically did not invest in the valuecreating capabilities of the company. They traded in the secondary
markets, in the realm of finance and the capital markets—Wall Street’s
domain—where liquidity, short-termism, and separation from the
everyday life and control of the corporation were the historical context. It
is instructive to note that the stock market was a vehicle that allowed
founders to cash out after corporations were already a going concern; the
secondary markets (i.e., the stock market) did not seed the corporation.
The excision of this history is crucial to the belief in the shareholder’s
righteous possession of the spoils of the company. It all depends on the
incorrect assumption that shareholders were actually the original fountain
of capital, the original investors who created the innovation-producing
capabilities of the modern corporation. In fact, the modern corporation was
built and sustained from retained earnings, the work of multiple
stakeholders, especially employees, and various inputs from founders;
most shareholders entered the picture after the fact, after corporations were
already a going concern, and mainly exchanged shares in the secondary
markets, with liquidity being their primary concern.
Moreover, despite financial interests rallying in the name of
shareholders in the 1980s and beyond, “Wall Street and corporate
executives historically advocated for widespread shareholding, not as a
vehicle to give shareholders control (as public shareholding was
understood and actualized to be a dilution of control), but as cultural
rehabilitation” to promote greater societal buy-in for multiple capitalist
50. It is important to mention that among the left-out masses were people of color and indigenous
peoples for whom the processes of enslavement, settler colonialism, and/or alien land laws, among
other exclusionary (or extractive) policies, prevented multiple communities from achieving prosperity
and security. At the same time, it was through the capture of their land and labor that individual
proprietorships were made possible in the first place.
51. HO, supra note 9, at 182.
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projects.52 In other words, the past forty years of intense financialization
advocated for a return to a “past that never was.”53 The 1980s corporate
takeover movement was framed as a restoration of shareholders’
ownership and control of corporations. It catalyzed and operationalized
the shareholder value worldview by tearing corporations from the multiple
stakeholder communities in which they were embedded and placing them
in a commoditized space of exchange where their stock price became their
single most important aspect. Because it was only through appreciation of
the stock value that corporations could avoid being taken over (higher
stock prices make a firm more expensive to purchase and thus offer some
protection from takeovers), the takeover movement effectively promoted
stock price as the singular obsession of the corporate world.
Of course, institutional investors on Wall Street have long viewed
corporations as stock prices in portfolios because, as spokespeople,
advisors, and players in the financial markets, their viewpoint has been
shaped by the stock market. Stock price has long been finance’s vantage
point: the difference between most of the twentieth century and the
contemporary moment is that this worldview has only recently become
pervasive and dominant. The stock market and the corporation were
historically separated and protected from each other. Wall Street
specialized in the stock market, meaning that it played with stocks and
owned shares, not corporations themselves. It was only with the 1980s
takeover movement that Wall Street ideologies crossed over to serve as a
rationale for reshaping corporate governance in the name of the
shareholders. Successive takeover movements fueled the past four decades
of financial deal-making, as corporations were increasingly treated as sites
of shareholder value extraction. Wall Street simply did not have the power
to do this before the Chicago School of neoclassical economic thought, led
by Friedman, and agency theory, championed by Jensen and Meckling,
provided academic legitimacy to the project,54 and before the flood of
investment money that came into mutual, pension, and retirement accounts
gave Wall Street billions of additional dollars to bolster its claims to speak
for all investors.
The origin myths of shareholder value primacy and ownership were
also made possible, dare I say subsidized, by the State. The extent to which
the U.S. has enacted policy (particularly tax policy) based on these myths
shows the social construction of both markets and state actions, how each
is centrally influenced by the other, and how these effects compound
52. Id. at 183.
53. Id. at 184.
54. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 37, at 309; see also MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM
AND FREEDOM (1962).
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unequal capital accumulation. Julia Ott, in a recent article in Dissent titled
How Tax Policy Created the 1%, shows that for over a century, U.S. tax
policy not only “advanced the accumulation of white wealth,” but also
reproduced the similar problematic assumption that equated shareholding
with proprietorship.55 Ott makes a crucial connection: the corresponding
narrative (often told by dominant financial actors and advocates) that
shores up the link between shareholding and corporate proprietorship is
based on the mistaken equation of secondary securities markets with
primary inputs and investments in a company.
These larger cultural interpretations (and misapprehensions), Ott
argues, are evident in comparatively lenient tax policies that favor profits
made from the buying and selling of stocks and bonds. The problematic
rationale for low taxes on capital gains emerges from the assumption that
these profits are generated from direct investment in the primary,
“productive” markets, and that they are continually re-invested to create
jobs and fund new ventures. Key historical examples are the Congressional
justifications and contestations around the Revenue Act of 1921, when a
consensus emerged in Congress that investment income should be taxed
at a “preferential or reduced tax rate” compared to regular income.56 This
development was due in part to a national marketing campaign during
WWI that promoted the sale of war bonds by linking “citizenship and
investment,” specifically national and individual independence with the
notion of investment in bonds as property ownership.57 By 1921, then,
Congress was determined to “protect . . . the investor” (rather than seeing
the investor as plutocrat), and “[b]ased upon this consensus, the Revenue
Act of 1921 separated different forms of income and honored investors
with a 12.5 percent rate on capital gains income, well below the top rate
of 50 percent for ordinary income from wages and salaries.”58 Even after
the Great Depression, the NYSE resisted attempts to levy taxes on the
wealthy by continuing to capitalize on these assumptions, framing
investment in stocks as productive of national growth and as an expression
of “the courage of private capital.”59 Not surprisingly, this discourse was
deployed in direct contradistinction to New Deal policies to help the poor:
investment incentives were framed as courageous, responsible, and
productive, while social welfare measures were characterized as the
opposite.
55. Julia Ott, How Tax Policy Created the 1%, DISSENT MAG. (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.
dissentmagazine.org/online_articles/tax-policy-history-by-for-1-percent
[https://perma.cc/LDS3BJC6].
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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These tax policies and preferences demonstrate the deep
ramifications of the logic that links the buying of stocks and other
securities and the income generated by their sale with production and,
correspondingly, portrays the stock market as an accurate proxy for the
work of capital and labor to establish and maintain institutions. As I
mentioned above, modern corporations have historically depended on
their own retained earnings generated from infusions of time, money, and
labor from founders and stakeholders, rather than on the investments of
shareholders in the secondary markets. And yet, financial representations
and logic attempt to re-write this historical context. As Ott argues, such
revisionist history has little empirical support:
Then as now, when investors trade stocks and bonds, money passes
from those who wish to buy to those who wish to sell. Corporations
and others who issue securities receive nothing from these trades
(except during an initial public offering). Those who earn capital
gains by profitably trading stocks or bonds (or selling a home, a
business, a barrel of oil, a derivative contract) might reinvest in new
and promising ventures that create jobs and grow the economy. But
history suggests they are more likely to spend those gains, or to
reinvest them in an asset bubble.60

The preference for capital gains, then, derives from the same fiction
as the origin myths undergirding shareholder value primacy. The
Presidents of the NYSE in the 1930s, Richard Whitney, and 1940s, Emil
Schram, rallied and lobbied politicians, financial interests, and managerial
associations, arguing that lowering capital gains taxes would lend
“confidence to capital,” which was crucial because “free equity capital”
would stimulate private enterprise and “achieve maximum production and
maximum employment.”61 Ott argues, quoting the post-WWII NYSE
Chairman Robert Boylan, that dire warnings of socialism were continually
mobilized when critics highlighted the elitist mythologies upon which
capital gains preferences rest: “If the capital that is required for industrial
expansion and maintaining full employment . . . is not provided by private
investors . . . then the alternative is Government financing.”62 Yet, as Ott
demonstrates, “[d]espite what the NYSE claimed, corporate reinvestment
of retained earnings continued to fund the bulk of economic expansion.”63

60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.

2020]

In the Name of Shareholder Value

629

BY WAY OF CONCLUSION
Since the 1980s, Wall Street financial institutions and actors have
engaged in a decades-long process of downsizing and restructuring
previously stable corporations in order to transform them into financial
assets whose earnings were largely redistributed to the very investors,
executives, and financial advisors who advised and brokered these
transformations. These massive shifts have played a central role in
widening socio-economic inequality in the U.S. and were justified, in no
small part, by the seeming righteousness of shareholder value and investor
dominance. Given the extent to which shareholder value has been used to
legitimize the right of dominant finance to shape what a corporation is for
and to whom it belongs, this Article attempts to lay bare the problematic
foundational assumptions upon which multiple shareholder value
arguments rest. While it is important to recognize that Wall Street’s
institutional power and access to large swaths of capital allow it to use and
abuse shareholder value justifications for its own benefit, there is also
something about the building blocks of shareholder value assumptions that
renders them particularly useful for dominant financial interests. In this
Article, I have argued that the origin story of corporate “ownership” by
shareholders (which undergirds the key justifications for shareholder value
primacy) is based on a series of ahistorical misrecognitions and underlying
myths, such as the problematic assertion that shareholders provided
original capital for the formation of modern public corporations as well as
the deliberate conflation of primary and secondary markets. As Julia Ott
cogently clarifies, these financial market constructs and ideas do the
following:
Neoliberal theory collapses any distinction between primary markets
(where enterprises obtain funding) and secondary markets (where
investors trade existing assets). Lumping these functions together,
neoliberal thought identifies “investment” and “investors”
as the sources of economic growth and progress. Corporations exist
to maximize returns to shareholders.64

The constructed importance of investors and the priority of
investment in neoliberal thought, from NYSE presidents to Milton
Friedman and Michael Jensen’s writings, played an outsized role in
justifying and catalyzing financial influence as well as shareholder value
primacy. What this Article attempts to unpack is the centrality of a

64. Julia Ott, Words Can’t Do the Work for Us, DISSENT MAG. (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.
dissentmagazine.org/blog/neoliberalism-forum-julia-ott [https://perma.cc/NR58-NKM2].
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problematic concept of “ownership” to neoliberal policy and practice
related to financialization and the financial markets.
In the decade since the financial crisis of 2008, many scholars, social
critics, and policymakers have investigated how and why finance
continues to exert undue influence on corporations, nations, and
economies after such a massive challenge to their legitimacy. I would
argue that one of the key reasons for Wall Street’s resurgence and
continued dominance is not only the fact that the U.S. social safety net, at
least for the middle class, has largely been outsourced to Wall Street
(which thus acquired the leverage to request bailouts in the name of Main
Street), but also that the concept of “Wall Street as investor = owner” has
not been sufficiently disputed. It is therefore crucial that we fundamentally
challenge the concept of ownership. This would allow us to imagine what
a post-shareholder value world might look like: What are the legal and
policy implications of challenging shareholder ownership? What would
our socio-economic values be? Whose interests should corporations serve?
To think more broadly and critically, it is important to draw from
diverse philosophies. For example, future scholarship should take
inspiration from scholars in critical race and indigenous studies65 who have
heterogeneously questioned the very meanings of ownership, property,
and possession that inform mainstream Western thought, and who use their
insights to inform studies of corporations, markets, and capitalism. Given
that the dominant logic of “proprietary and commoditized models of social
relations”66 as well as the initial infrastructures of accumulation in the U.S.
were made possible by the colonization of indigenous peoples and the
enslavement of African Americans, the very notion of ownership is
necessarily problematic. In other words, if the very “market for land was,
after all, predicated upon the military conquest of Indigenous peoples,
their forced removal from the territories in question, and their de jure and
de facto exclusion from the market through legislation explicitly designed
to ensure Indians could not compete with white settlers when it came time
to (re)purchase land at auction,”67 then it is incumbent upon us to question
the politics and uneven power relations that undergird both the concept
and the conditions of “ownership” itself.

65. See, e.g., CEDRIC J. ROBINSON, BLACK MARXISM: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK RADICAL
TRADITION (2d ed. 2000); AUDRA SIMPSON, THEORIZING NATIVE STUDIES (Andrea Smith ed., 2014);
Nancy Fraser, Expropriation and Exploitation in Racialized Capitalism: A Reply to Michael Dawson,
3 CRITICAL HIST. STUD. 163 (2016); Jodi Melamed, Racial Capitalism, 1 CRITICAL ETHNIC STUD. 76
(2015).
66. See Robert Nichols, Theft Is Property! The Recursive Logic of Dispossession, 46 POL.
THEORY 3, 3 (2018).
67. Id. at 20.

